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Abstract 
 
 
Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989, 
the only holiday themed religious display cases decided by the Court on the 
grounds on Establishment Clause violations, demonstrate the inadequacies of 
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The precedent set out by the 
Supreme Court in Lynch v. Donnelly and Allegheny v. ACLU compromise 
lower courts’ decision making process. Discrepancy in methods, results, and 
opinions threatens the credibility of the Court. This not only confuses the idea 
of religious freedom, but it also threatens its very core.  
Lynch and Allegheny were intended to clarify Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and provide a standard for interpretation for lower courts to 
follow. However, the Court failed to agree upon a legal doctrine that would 
achieve these goals. This stems from a deeper conflict over the fundamental 
principles underlying the Establishment Clause, which prevents the Court 
from providing the guidance necessary to lower court decision-making. 
This study examined Circuit Court cases to determine the effect that Lynch 
and Allegheny had on lower courts. Compiling circuit court cases involving 
disputes of religious symbols displayed in the holiday context and analyzing 
the rulings provides a manageable case set that will accurately depict the way 
lower courts have responded to the Lynch and Allegheny decisions. Empirical 
data shows that cohesiveness within a higher court results in fewer reversals 
of the lower court’s decisions. Therefore, circuit courts’ rulings on religious 
displays lack uniformity because of the Supreme Court’s inability to provide 
consistent guidelines. Evaluation of Circuit Court decisions will provide an 
accurate representation of the problems that exist within the appellate court 
system.  
I examined the methodology used by courts and the outcome reached. 
Cases that involved similar displays but resulted in different rulings or cases 
that employed different doctrines to come to the same ruling supported the 
claim that the Supreme Court has failed to produce guidelines that the lower 
courts can effectively apply to a wide range of cases. The 20 cases evaluated 
in this study were classified according to the type of display. Two categories 
of cases emerged: displays of a single, unattended religious symbol, such as a 
solitary crèche or menorah and displays with one or more symbols, such as a 
menorah and Christmas tree, included as part of a larger display with clearly 
secular symbols, such as a reindeer, candy cane, or banner.  
For combined displays, the inclusion of secular objects mitigated the 
religious tones of the message perceived by the reasonable observer and were 
almost always allowed. For unattended displays, the judges are not equipped 
with a clear rule and case outcomes were inconsistent. The overarching issue 
still remains that the Court needs to provide better guidance for lower courts.  
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1 
1. Introduction 
 
 
Religious freedom is a defining principle of America’s founding: it 
coursed through the colonies and gave rise to the fight for independence. It 
originates from the fact that the settlers came to the New World to escape 
religious persecution and the problems associated with state sponsored 
religion. Justice Hugo Black best describes these consequences in Engel v. 
Vitale when he states, “A union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and degrade religion.”1 As a result, it should come as no surprise 
that the first article of the Bill of Rights is dedicated to protecting the people 
from the harms of government involvement in religion.  
The First Amendment to the Constitution holds that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.” 2 These phrases guarantee freedom from and of religion; 
that is, freedom from state or Federal creation of a national church or 
declaration of a national religion, and freedom to practice religion without 
interference from state or federal governments.3 
Though simple in theory, the application of these principles has not 
been straightforward. More questions than answers arise from the few words 
                                                 
1
 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, at 431 (1962). 
2
 U.S. Constitution, amend. 1. 
3
 David M. O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, 6th ed. Vol. 2, (2005), 688. Daniel   
Parish, “Private Religious Displays in Public Fora,” The University of Chicago Law Review 
61, no. 1 (1994): 254.  
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dedicated to provide one of the most important constitutional guarantees. As 
First Amendment jurisprudence developed, the Supreme Court became 
increasingly divided over Establishment Clause interpretation. Justices 
disagree on the principles embodied by the Establishment Clause, as well as 
the legal doctrine that should be utilized to decide cases. The inability of the 
Court to agree on an interpretive framework that is reliable and protective of 
religious freedom has serious consequences for Establishment Clause 
doctrine. 
Religious symbols displayed as a part of holiday scenes is one sect of 
Establishment Clause case law that has suffered from inconsistent Supreme 
Court guidance. Discord among the Court has serious implications for the 
judicial system and for local governments. Discrepancy in methods, results, 
and opinions threatens the credibility of the Court. This not only confuses the 
idea of religious freedom, but it also threatens its very core. The precedent set 
out by the Supreme Court in Lynch v. Donnelly and Allegheny v. ACLU 
compromise lower courts’ decision making process. They had contrasting 
outcomes, a bare majority, and multiple opinions were issued, each proposing 
vastly different theories and tests for Establishment Clause cases. Therefore, 
the Court’s rulings created inconsistency among circuit, district, and local 
courts across the nation.  The focus of this study will analyze the effect Lynch 
and Allegheny had on the appellate courts by studying the Circuit Court cases 
that emerged after Lynch and Allegheny that caused confusion in the appellate 
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courts. In turn, this might help the Supreme Court to grapple with the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause in a way that allows for an improvement in 
constitutional analyses.  
1.1 The Basics: Religious Display Cases 
Government sponsorship of religious displays is especially illustrative 
of the consequences that stem from disagreement over interpretive 
approaches. Religious symbols are a primary mechanism to convey the beliefs 
of the religion and are centrally important to the practice of that religion.4 
Private displays on public property or publicly funded religious displays raise 
the question of whether the government is endorsing a particular religion. 
Secularization of religious holidays and the presence of religious pluralism in 
America make it difficult to ascertain the message emanating from a range of 
different displays, blurring the line between permissible and impermissible. 
Nativity scenes, or crèches, that commemorate Christmas, a federal holiday 
with both religious and secular aspects, are disputed most frequently. In a 
display with secular elements, such as a Santa Claus, and religious elements, 
such as a nativity scene depicting the birth of Jesus, it is often hard to establish 
the overall message emanating from the display. Thus, the issue becomes 
complicated for cities, town, and private entities that wish to erect displays on 
public property or using public funds.   
                                                 
4
 Joshua D. Zarrow, “Of Crosses and Crèches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly 
Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols,” American University Law Review 35 (1986): 477. 
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1.2 Framing the Issue 
The Supreme Court’s rulings on government sponsorship of religious 
displays illustrate the consequences that arise from constitutional 
interpretation that lacks a consistent framework. Reliable methods of 
interpretation are essential because they facilitate the decision making process 
of lower courts and help local governments construct religious displays 
without violating the First Amendment.5 Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984 and 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989, the only holiday themed religious 
display cases decided by the Court on the grounds on Establishment Clause 
violations, demonstrate the inadequacies of the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. Bare majorities issued opposite rulings for similar displays, 
opinions were numerous and obscure, and the members of the Court 
vigorously disagreed with one another. 
The Court has failed to adopt a single theory to interpret holiday 
display cases, relying on a number of different tests, mainly a lax version of 
the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and a neutrality approach. All of these 
result in different outcomes when applied to the same case, causing confusion 
for lower courts.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 David Felsen, “Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency 
for the Future,” American University Law Review 38 (1989): 395. 
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2. Understanding the Meaning of the Establishment Clause 
 
Before examining the Supreme Court precedents and the resulting 
appellate court cases, a discussion of Establishment Clause theories and 
fundamentals is essential. Several problems emerge in constitutional 
interpretation of the religious freedom clauses.  
2.1 Tension between the Clauses  
First of all, taken together, the clauses point in different directions. The 
Establishment Clause requires separation of government and religion, 
prohibiting legislation that sponsors one religion over another, or over 
irreligion. On the other hand, the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals 
from government interference with private religious expression.6 The 
Establishment Clause suggests that government should not pass laws that 
relate to religious practice in any way. However, the Free Exercise Clause 
seems to demand that the government take action to ensure that people are 
able to practice their religion freely. As such, the two guarantees are 
inherently at odds with one another. For example, legislation that grants 
exceptions for people of a certain religion, whose beliefs are at odds with the 
law, can be challenged as unconstitutional government endorsement of 
religion. However, by failing to provide an exemption, the government can be 
charged with violating the Free Exercise Clause on the grounds that it coerced 
religious groups to engage in practices contrary to their beliefs.  
                                                 
6
 O’Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics, 689. 
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2.2 The Language of the Amendment 
The broad language creates another source of tension and confusion in 
constitutional interpretation. The language of the clause is vague and poses a 
multitude of questions: what defines a religion and what constitutes an 
establishment thereof? What is a law “respecting” such an establishment? To 
what extent must a law affect a person’s religious practice for it to be 
considered as infringing on the free exercise guarantee? What are the limits, if 
any, on a person’s right to practice his or her religion? Is “no law” an absolute 
ban, or are there exceptions? Examples of exemptions from the requirements 
of law due to religious reasons considered by the Court extend to jury duty, 
public education, military drafts, Social Security, payroll taxes for church 
operated schools, salute of the flag in public schools, provision of chaplains in 
prison or the military, and a range of others.7 Unfortunately, the text of the 
First Amendment provides little insight on the answers to these questions and 
the overall unifying meaning of the clauses.8 Additionally, the views of the 
Framers of the amendment do not lend themselves to a decisive method of 
application to current issues.9 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Michael W. McConnell, “Accommodation of Religion,” The Supreme Court Review 1985 
(1985): 24-26. 
8
 Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (1986), 84. 
9See Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (1986); Robert L. 
Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction (1982); Stephen 
M. Feldman, Please Don’t Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation 
of Church and State, (1997).  
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2.3 Problems with the Historical Approach 
Analyzing the historical context of the First Amendment does not aid 
in deciphering the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Rather, it adds 
another obstacle to constitutional interpretation. Tension exists because 
religious elements are a part of many government institutions even though the 
separation of government and religion formed the backbone of the founding 
era and is engrained into American culture.  
In some instances, the historical record contradicts itself and is 
unclear. By relying on opposing remarks by the Framers, people can support 
contrasting theories. James Madison and several others wanted to completely 
bar Congress from ever passing a law regarding religion. Jefferson agreed 
with Madison, and believed that there should be a strict divide between church 
and state. Contrary to Madison, Jefferson conceded that this guarantee is not 
absolute.10 Beyond the Framers’ specific concern with the establishment of a 
national church or religion that would use the publics’ tax money to fund 
religious activity, it is unclear how religious freedom would be applied in 
other circumstances. 
America’s settlement by Protestants escaping religious persecution 
assured that religious freedom would be a defining principle underlying the 
                                                 
10
 For example, some scholars use original intent to prove that government cannot aid religion 
in any way, directly or indirectly (See Philip B. Kurland, Religion and the Law of Church and 
State and the Supreme Court (1962); Levy (1986); and Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and 
Freedom (1967)). Others use historical records to support the claim that government can aid 
religions in a nondiscriminatory way (See Cord (1982); Gerard V. Bradley, Church-State 
Relationships in America (1987)). 
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new government. However, as a homogenously Protestant society, the settlers 
did not intend the First Amendment to banish every reference to God or 
religion by any governmental institution. In fact, many scholars advocate the 
view that this religious freedom was solely applicable to Christian, and mostly 
Protestant sects.11  Massachusetts, for example, established the 
Congregational Church and taxed Quakers, Baptists, and other religious 
sects.12 Therefore, government endorsements of Christianity were not 
questioned as unconstitutional. Scholars that support this view point to 
discrimination against religious minorities, especially Catholics and Jews that 
existed well into the late1800s. They also cite the establishment and protection 
of Christian practices, such as those implemented in public schools.  
Examples of government mixing with religion are widespread: the 
Declaration of Independence references a “Creator,” George Washington 
declared that November 26th should be a day to give thanks and pray to the 
Lord, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison supported “thanksgiving” day 
and issued religious proclamations, Congress sessions begin with a prayer, 
Court sessions open with “God save the United States and this honorable 
Court,” the pledge of allegiance states that the U.S. is “one nation, under 
God,” the national slogan is “In God We Trust,” and the religious presence in 
                                                 
11
 See generally Douglas Laycock, “‘Nonpreferential’ Aid to Religion: A False Claim about 
Original Intent,” William and Mary Law Review (1986); Bruce M. Zessar, “Government 
Participation in Holiday Religious Displays: Improving on Lynch and Allegheny,” DePaul 
Law Review (1991); S. Feldman (1997); Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest 
for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (1995).  
12
 O’Brien, 689. 
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public schools which were commonplace through the 1950s.13 This is not an 
exhaustive list of governmental endorsements of religion. Plus, most of these 
practices still occur today. Perhaps the most striking examples of government 
endorsement of religion come from religious practices in public schools. Bible 
readings, teachings of the Bible and Christianity, Christmas and Easter 
celebrations, and other religious practices were commonplace in public 
schools through the 1950s.  
These practices were unchallenged until the 1920s when a massive 
influx of immigration changed America’s religious landscape and increased 
the presence of religious minorities.14 It was during the immigration boom that 
America became characterized as a safe-haven for immigrants seeking 
freedom from inequities of all kinds. The Statue of Liberty, now a symbol of 
America, is inscribed with a poem that illustrates this idea when it states, 
“Give me your tired, your poor, / your huddled masses yearning to breathe 
free, / the wretched refuse of your teeming shore.”15 First Amendment rulings 
were scarce before this period. In fact, the development of the constitutional 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause did not begin until 1947 in the 
landmark case Everson v. Board of Education. Against the backdrop of 
increased religious pluralism in America and the movement by the Supreme 
                                                 
13
 Cord, 223-32; S. Feldman, 222. 
14
 S. Feldman, 218-30. 
15
 Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” (1883), 10-12. 
10 
 
Court toward a preferential treatment of certain civil liberties, including 
religious liberty, Establishment Clause doctrine was developed. 
 
3. Theories for Interpreting the Establishment Clause 
The inevitable confusion and disagreement over the precise meaning 
of the Establishment Clause combined with the importance of religious liberty 
necessitates a clear, consistent method to determine cases. Establishment 
Clause doctrine is divided into three main approaches: strict separation, 
accommodation, and neutrality. Each intends to capture the main principle 
embodied by the Establishment Clause, creating a theory that lends itself to 
tests and standards that analyze Establishment Clause cases consistently.16 All 
of these approaches are based in constitutional logic, but result in different 
outcomes when applied to Establishment Clause cases. Criticism of the Court 
for failing to reach a substantive approach is abounding.17 The specific tests 
used for interpretation emerge from these doctrinal approaches and suffer 
from the same shortcomings by failing to fully capture or protect the 
guarantees provided by the Establishment Clause.18  
                                                 
16
 Mark Tushnet, “The Constitution of Religion,” The Review of Politics (1988): 628. 
17
 See Jesse H. Choper, “Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard.” 
Minnesota Law Review (1963); Choper, “The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: 
Reconciling the Conflict,” University of Pittsburg Law Review (1980); Choper, “The 
Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability,” Journal of Law & Politics (2002); Laycock 
(1986). 
18
 See Steven D. Smith, “Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment 
Neutrality and the ‘No Endorsement’ Test,” Michigan Law Review (1987); Noah Feldman, 
“From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause,” California Law 
Review (2002); Andrew Rostein, “Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and the 
Establishment Clause,” Columbia Law Review (1993). 
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3.1 Separation 
Separationists base their argument on Jefferson’s “wall of separation 
between Church and State” and hold that government and religion should be 
entirely distinct.19 Separationists are split according to their interpretation of 
the historical record in regards to the legality of laws that have an indirect or 
incidental effect of aiding religion. The “softer” view of separation allows 
legislation that has a secondary effect that aids religions, as long as it does not 
discriminate between religions.20 Others favor a high wall approach, which 
bans legislation that has an indirect, incidental, or secondary effect of aiding 
or inhibiting religion.  
Strict separationists base their “no aid” argument on historical analysis 
and the original intent of the Framers.21 Per this approach, laws which have 
the primary or indirect effect of aiding or inhibiting any religion are 
prohibited.22 This would create an absolute ban on public displays of religious 
symbols, government programs in parochial schools, legislative chaplains, 
Congressional prayer, the Supreme Court’s reference to God in its opening 
statement, and government aid to religious organizations as a part of social 
                                                 
19
 Levy, 181. 
20
 Frank Guliuzza, III, Over the Wall: Protecting Religious Expression in the Public Square, 
(2000), 66.  
21
 See Pfeffer (1967); Levy (1986); N. Feldman (2002); Norman Dorsen, and Charles Sims, 
“The Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment,” University of Illinois Law Review (1985); 
Daan Braveman, “The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality,” 
Maryland Law Review (1986); Steve Gey, “Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the 
Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause,” Columbia Law Review (1981); William 
Van Alstyne, “Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall: A Comment on 
Lynch v. Donnelly,” Duke Law Journal (1984). 
22
 Shahin Rezai, “County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause 
Analysis,” American University Law Review (1990): 504. 
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services, health care, and similar programs.23 This doctrine was written into 
constitutional history by Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education of 
Ewing Township when he states, “The First Amendment has erected a wall 
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We 
could not approve the slightest breach.”24  
Proponents of the softer version of separation are against the “no-aid” 
principle advocated by strict separationalists, criticizing it for being too 
absolute and inflexible. They hold that a wall of separation does not preclude 
secular legislation that provides nonpreferential aid.25 Nonpreferentialists 
believe government must be nondiscriminatory and not favor one religion 
over another when it provides aid.26 
Opponents to the separation doctrine argue that some intermingling of 
government and religion is inevitable, and a strict separation doctrine is 
unrealistic for Establishment Clause interpretation. Chief Justice Berger 
supports this view in Walz v. Tax Commission in 1970: “No perfect or 
absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion 
Clauses is an involvement of sorts -- one that seeks to mark boundaries to 
                                                 
23
 Guliuzza, 66. 
24
 330 U.S. 1 at 18. 
25
 Cord, 15. 
26
 See Cord (1982); Bradley (1987). 
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avoid excessive entanglement.”27 Additionally, it is not in accordance with 
original intent of the Framers.28  
3.2 Accommodation 
Accommodationists highlight the significance of religion to America 
in holding that the Establishment Clause permits legislation that benefits 
religion, as long as the government does not discriminate among different 
religions.29 They reject the importance given to original intent by 
separationists and question its relevance in today’s society. They suggest that 
America is a religious nation and recognizing the significance of faith-based 
organizations in American culture enhances religious freedom. Michael 
McConnell embodies this view in his paper “Accommodation of Religion,” 
when he states: 
[A]ccommodation of religion is consistent with the political theory 
underlying the Constitution…an emphasis on the central value of 
religious liberty can generate principles for distinguishing between 
legitimate accommodation and unwarranted benefits to religion.30  
 
A principle of accommodation enhances religion and accounts for the 
religious pluralism that pervades American society.  
Accommodationists oppose strict neutrality because the inherent 
tension between the two clauses likely results in restriction, and even 
                                                 
27
 Walz v. Tax Commission 397 U.S. 664, at 670 (1970). 
28
 See Cord (1982); S. Feldman (1997); Donald Beschle, “The Conservative as a Liberal: The 
Religion Clauses, Liberal Authority, and the Approach of Justice O’Connor,” University of 
Notre Dame (1987). 
29
 See McConnell (1985).  
30
 McConnell, 59. 
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violation, of the liberties guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.31 This view 
was applied in Walz v. Tax Commission, evidenced by Chief Justice Berger’s 
when stating, “…the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute 
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to 
clash with the other.32 This approach is favored by Chief Justice Burger, 
Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and O’Connor. Opponents reject this approach 
because the increased flexibility it allows results in less consistent and 
predictable analysis.33 
3.3 Neutrality 
The third approach, neutrality, purports that the Establishment Clause 
requires that government does not discriminate among religions or between 
religion and irreligion, obliging that government laws that affect religion must 
be based on secular purposes.34 Justice Black outlined the doctrine in Everson: 
“[T]he First Amendment…requires the state to be a neutral in its relations 
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the 
state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap 
religions than it is to favor them.”35 
                                                 
31
 Rezai (1990).  
32
 Walz, 397 U.S. 668-69 (1970). 
33
 Felsen (1989). 
34
 See Beschle (1987); Cord (1982); Arnold H. Loewy, “Rethinking Government Neutrality 
Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice 
O’Connor’s Insight,” North Carolina Law Review (1986): Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 
(1986). 
35
 Everson, 330 US 1 at 18 (1947). 
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Several variations exist. In its most absolute form, strict neutrality bars 
laws that aid religious organizations directly or indirectly, except when 
covering a welfare grant applicable to everyone regardless of their religious 
beliefs, or lack thereof.36 Professor Kurland is a well known advocate of this 
position, which prohibits accommodation.37 Benevolent neutrality, on the 
other hand, tolerates accommodation. Chief Justice Berger describes the 
benefits of benevolent neutrality over strict neutrality in Walz: 
The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an 
absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of 
these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or 
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited. Short of those 
expressly proscribed governmental acts, there is room for play in the 
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious 
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.38 
 
Criticisms stem from the lack of precise methods to define the neutral 
categories.39 Modified versions of these theories, as well as entirely different 
approaches, have been suggested as well.40 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Gey (1981).  
37
 Kurland (1962). 
38
 Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (1970). 
39
 Tushnet (1988).  
40
 For example: the political equality theory (N. Feldman 2002); the symbolic approach 
(William Marshall 1986); two track approach, (Laurence Tribe 1988); unitary reading of both 
clauses with less emphasis on the Establishment Clause, (Choper 1980 and Kurland 1962); no 
solution is possible and the quest for such an approach degrades religious freedom (Smith 
1995); pluralist approach (Mark de Wolfe Howe 1965). 
16 
 
3.4 Interpretive Tests 
Over the past sixty years, the Court has regularly heard Establishment 
Clause cases, producing a number of tests to guide constitutional 
interpretation. However, they failed to steer decision making because they 
were used erratically and frequently changed.41 This is evidenced by the 
Lemon test, a three prong test that emerged from the majority opinion in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971. Lemon v. Kurtzman involved a challenge to a 
Pennsylvania state law that the Court struck down for violating the principle 
that government should not endorse religion.42 The Lemon test holds that a 
law must have a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion, and must not foster excessive government entanglement with 
religion.43 It allowed the Burger Court to move away from a principle of strict 
separation, a doctrine that the Court felt was unsound.44 Instead, the Court 
moved toward accommodating religion, which is highlighted by Justice 
Burger’s opinion: “Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that 
the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and 
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship.”45 However, Lemon has not been used steadily, as justices 
disagree on its application. As a result, an ad hoc approach has emerged and 
                                                 
41
 Felsen, 395; Rezai, 503. 
42Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
43
 Id. At 612-13. 
44
 Id. at 615.  
45
 Id. at 614. 
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rulings are often contradictory. In response to this, a number of variations to 
Lemon have been proposed by the Court.  
3.4.1 The Endorsement Test 
Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test is the most influential test put 
forth from the bench in response to Lemon. The test modifies the purpose and 
effect prong of the Lemon test and “requires courts to examine whether 
government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually 
conveys a message of endorsement.”46 O’Connor advocates the practicality of 
this test when she states: 
The endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it gives 
to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect. In 
this country, church and state must necessarily operate within the same 
community. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that the 
secular interests of government and the religious interests of various 
sects and their adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and 
combine.47 
 
She warns against reliance on Lemon because although it is useful, it does not 
fully embrace the constitutional principles at the heart of the Establishment 
Clause. She purports that the Endorsement Test does embody religious liberty 
because it “does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or 
from taking religion into account in making law and policy. It does preclude 
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion 
or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”48 
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 Despite the Court’s increased use of O’Connor’s test, especially in 
religious symbol cases, Establishment Clause jurisprudence lacks 
standardization and continually receives criticism from legal scholars.49 This 
failure is especially evident in the Court’s rulings on religious displays in the 
public forum.  
 
4. The Establishment Clause and Religious Display Cases 
4.1 Lynch v. Donnelly 
4.1.1 Facts of the Case 
Lynch v. Donnelly, decided in 1984, considered the constitutionality of 
the City of Pawtucket’s Christmas display, located in a park not owned by the 
City. The display consisted of the crèche, a Christmas tree, a “Seasons 
Greetings” banner, a Santa Claus House, reindeer pulling a sleigh, candy-
striped poles, carolers, colored lights, and cut-outs of clowns, teddy bears, and 
an elephant, and other figures associated with the Christmas season.50 The 
crèche included the traditional figures, such as baby Jesus, Mary, and 
Joseph.51 The figures, which were owned by the city and ranged from fives 
inches to life size, had been included in the display for over 40 years and no 
                                                 
49
 See Braveman (1986); Choper (1963); Choper (1980); Carole Kagan, “Squeezing the Juice 
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(1984); Gey (1981); N. Feldman (2002); Dorsen and Sims (1985); Beschle (1987); Smith 
(1987). 
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 Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 at 671 (1984). 
51Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671 (1984).  
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longer created expenses for the City.52 Its inclusion was challenged as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court, reversing the 
decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the display did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.53  
4.1.2 The Decision 
In a bare 5-4 majority, written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held 
that the nativity scene was constitutional due to the physical context of the 
scene as part of a display celebrating the holiday season. Chief Justice Burger 
argued against the separation of church and state, citing the many instances of 
official acknowledgements of religion. He argued that “If the presence of the 
crèche in this display violates the Establishment Clause, a host of other forms 
of taking official note of Christmas, and of our religious heritage, are equally 
offensive to the Constitution.”54 Instead, he wrote that the Constitution 
“affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all 
religions, and forbids hostility toward any.”55 Though evaluating the display 
using the Lemon test, Chief Justice Burger noted the Court’s “unwillingness to 
be confined to any single test of criterion in this sensitive area.”56  He argued 
that the crèche had a secular purpose because the scene must be viewed in the 
context of the holiday season as a depiction of the history of Christmas.57 In 
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viewing the scene in this manner, the primary purpose did not advance any 
religion, but rather celebrated the historical aspect.58 Finally, the scene did not 
create excessive government entanglement because there was little 
administrative interaction and a minor cost. With the Lemon test satisfied, the 
Chief Justice concluded by saying, “Any notion that these symbols pose a real 
danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed.”59 
Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion suggesting a new way to 
view Establishment Clause doctrine, unsure that the Lemon test embodies its 
fundamental principles. She held that it “prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the 
political community.”60 Government violates the Establishment Clause under 
this modified doctrine by “communicating a message of government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”61 As applied to the crèche in Lynch, 
she argues that its inclusion in the display does not promote religion, but 
rather the “celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols.”62 
The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, argued that neutrality, not 
accommodation, is at the heart of the Establishment Clause. He criticized the 
application of the Lemon test by the majority, and showed that the display 
would not pass a vigorous application of the test.63 The crèche did not have a 
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secular purpose, and the goals of the City with regards to celebrating the 
holiday could be accomplished with the other secular Christmas symbols.64 
The primary effect of the crèche promoted Christianity. Finally, the display 
fostered excessive government entanglement with religion by potentially 
causing other religions to push to have their symbols included, leading the 
City to become intertwined with many religious groups.65 Justice Brennan 
also criticized the majority’s historical argument and the link to official 
acknowledgements of religion to justify the crèche.66 He asserts that official 
acknowledgements of religion, such as Congressional prayer, which have 
existed since the founding, might be legitimate, but “the development of 
Christmas as a public holiday is a comparatively recent phenomenon.”67  
4.1.3 Problems for Future Analysis 
The use of such a detail-specific analysis without providing an 
overarching doctrinal approach to interpretation led to confusion. Though the 
majority made clear that the holiday context made the Lynch display 
permissible, they failed to address the constitutionality of displays in other 
contexts, a wide range of which were bound to appear in lower court cases. 
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4.2 County of Allegheny v. ACLU 
In an attempt to elucidate the Lynch ruling, the Court heard County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989.68 Unfortunately, this only added to existing 
confusion.  
4.2.1 Facts of the Case 
Allegheny involved two privately owned holiday displays located on 
public property in Pittsburgh. The first was a crèche located on the Grant 
Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse.69 The display included two 
banners, one noting ownership by the Holy Name Society and the other 
featuring a Latin phrase which translates to “Glory to God in the Highest.”70 
The second display was an 18’ tall Menorah, located outside the City-County 
Building next to a 45’ tall Christmas tree decorated with lights and ornaments, 
and a sign reading “Salute to Liberty.”71 A photograph of the displays can be 
seen below, in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. 
                                                 
68George M. Janocsko, “‘Beyond the “Plastic Reindeer Rule’: The Curious Case of County of 
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,” Duquesne Law Review 28 (1990): 451. 
69
 County of Allegheny v. ACLU 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989). 
70
 Alleghney, 492 U.S. at 585 (1989). 
71
 Id. at 573. 
23 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Crèche found to violate the Establishment Clause in Allegheny. 
Source: Hampton Dellinger, “Words Are Enough” (1997): 1722, Image 4. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Menorah found not to violate the Establishment Clause in 
Allegheny. 
Source: Hampton Dellinger, (June 1997): 1722, Image 4. 
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4.2.2 The Decision  
The Court was even more divided in the Allegheny decision, ruling 5-4 
that the crèche violated the Establishment clause and 6-3 that the Menorah 
was permissible. Five separate opinions were written for the crèche case, each 
providing different frameworks for interpretation. No majority opinion was 
given for the Menorah display. With only a partial majority opinion written 
for the crèche display and each opinion offering different interpretive 
approaches, the Allegheny precedent becomes exceedingly confusing.  
Justice Blackmun wrote the partial majority opinion, joined by Justices 
O’Connor and Stevens, adopting Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test first 
laid out in her concurrence in Lynch.72 He emphasized the primary effect 
prong of the Lemon test, holding that the core of the Establishment Clause “at 
the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on 
questions of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant 
in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.’”73 As applied to 
the displays in the case, the majority found that the crèche, especially when 
accompanied by the banner, served as a government endorsement of 
Christianity. Justice Blackmun was not joined by other justices for his opinion 
on the Menorah. Focusing on the context of the Menorah, next to the 
Christmas tree and the “Salute to Liberty” sign, he argued that the display 
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“recognizes that Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same holiday season, 
which has attained a secular status in our society.”74 
Though a majority agreed that the endorsement analysis was the 
correct principle and signed on to Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the crèche, 
they disagreed on how to apply the test. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence 
emphasized the need to view the circumstances of a certain action to 
determine whether it endorses or disapproves of religion.75 She focuses on the 
effect for a “reasonable observer” viewing the scene, and agrees that the 
crèche endorsed religion while the Menorah scene provided a message of 
“cultural diversity…and tolerance.”76 In her concurrence, she develops and 
justifies her “endorsement test.” She claims that a government action that 
endorses religion or disapproves of other beliefs or non-belief has the 
“impermissible effect of ‘mak[ing] religion relevant, in reality or public 
perception, to status in the political community.’”77  
Justices Stevens and Brennan argued for invalidation of both displays. 
Justice Stevens concurred with the crèche and dissented with the Menorah, 
arguing for a “strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on 
public property.”78 This prohibits displays with a non-secular context, 
providing a strict interpretation of the endorsement test. Following a neutrality 
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approach, Justice Stevens’ test looks at the object itself and bars all religious 
symbols from being displayed by the government.  
Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent and joined by Justices Scalia, 
Rehnquist, and White, advanced a “non coercion” principle.79 He states that 
government accommodation is part of America’s cultural and political 
heritage, but that it is limited such that government cannot coerce support of 
religion and government cannot benefit religion in a way that benefits are 
great enough to establish a state church.80 Under this non-coercion principle, 
both displays were constitutional because the City was participating in the 
“tradition of government accommodation and acknowledgement of religion 
that has marked our history from the beginning.”81  
4.2.3 Problems for Future Analysis 
This is striking and demonstrative of the deficiencies in Establishment 
Clause understanding and analysis. A 5-4 division speaks measure by itself, 
but in addition, five justices put forth approaches for analysis that rest on 
opposing constitutional principles and highlight different meanings of 
religious freedom. Further still, the analysis used resulted in opposite rulings 
for seemingly similar displays. Instead of providing a rule for interpretation, 
the Court established an “indeterminate analytical framework where 
everything is relevant but nothing is singularly decisive.”82 In effect, the Court 
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has guaranteed confusion among judges and local governments, which causes 
increased litigation and inconsistency in lower court rulings.  
 
5. Data and Research Design 
5.1 Questions of Study 
Do Lynch and Allegheny actually produce the degree of lower court 
chaos that many scholars depict? Does variance come from a small number of 
courts issuing conflicting decisions or are all courts similarly confused? When 
courts issue rulings that conflict with the precedent of the Supreme Court or of 
other lower courts, what causes the clash? That is, what parts of the Lynch and 
Allegheny decisions are most perplexing? In this analysis, I intend to embark 
on a review of the Lynch and Allegheny progeny in order to provide 
substantive answers to these questions.   
5.2 Judicial Theory 
 As the highest authority in the judicial system, the Supreme Court 
plays an important role in deciding many of America’s most divisive issues. 
However, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court is part of a 
three-tiered federal judicial system that includes thirteen courts of appeals and 
ninety-four district courts.83 The Supreme Court can hear a limited number of 
cases each year, so it relies heavily on lower courts to enforce its decisions 
and comply with its opinions when deciding cases. Appellate courts play a 
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key role in ensuring implementation and consistency of federal law. 
Understanding the way these courts interact and its influence on judicial 
decision making is essential in order to analyze the effects of Lynch and 
Allegheny on lower courts and determine the causes for inconsistent rulings in 
circuit and district Courts. 
Traditionally, legal scholars explain the relationship between the 
Supreme Court and the Circuit and District Courts using the hierarchical 
model, based from the principal-agent theory, in which the Supreme Court is 
the principal and enacts policies which the lower courts, as the agents, must 
implement.84 More basically, the system is a pyramid and the Supreme Court 
sits on the top, with circuit courts in the middle and the district forming the 
base.85 The doctrine of vertical precedent, that lower courts are obliged to 
follow the decisions and methods of higher courts, is especially powerful in 
this model.86 There is considerable research that supports this model, showing 
lower courts implement precedent set out by the Supreme Court based on the 
fear that the Court can review and overturn their decisions.87 The Court 
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monitors rulings of circuit courts, which monitor district courts in order to 
ensure consistency. Reversal corrects an errant ruling and signals the 
preferences of the superior court to lower courts. But in the case of religious 
displays, the Supreme Court’s precedent has not served to signal the justice’s 
preferences regarding Establishment Clause interpretation. 
The research conducted by a group of scholars in support of the 
interaction model, which focuses on the Supreme Court’s dependence on the 
lower courts to enforce federal law, help to explain the effect of 
cohesiveness.88 The Supreme Court can decide a small number of cases each 
year, leaving the circuit court as the highest authority for the majority of 
litigation. Empirical data shows that cohesiveness within a higher court results 
in fewer reversals of the lower court’s decisions.89 For example, when a 
circuit issues consistent rulings, district courts are less likely to issue an errant 
decision. However, circuit courts’ rulings on religious displays lack 
uniformity because of the Supreme Court’s inability to provide consistent 
guidelines. Per this theory, this leads to increased litigation and the possibility 
for significant discrepancies across the U.S. based on a particular circuit’s 
interpretation of the Lynch and Allegheny precedent. 
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In order to analyze the effects of Lynch and Allegheny lower courts, it 
is important to understand the way incoherency and confusion in the Supreme 
Court affects the decision making process of lower court judges. Judicial 
decision making is described by the legal model, which asserts that judges are 
neutral decision makers who make decisions based on precedent, the 
Constitution, and relevant statutes.90 In general, research shows that lower 
court compliance with precedent is correlated to coherency, persuasiveness, 
and support by the Court.91 This is crucial to an analysis of the effects of 
Lynch and Allegheny on lower court rulings because it suggests that when 
faced with inconsistent precedent and confusion regarding the Constitutional 
principles, judges will have to decide cases on other grounds. The legal model 
does not account for the outcomes in Establishment Clause cases, in which 
there is a high level of judicial discretion because judges need determine how 
to interpret the vague text of the First Amendments. Judicial preferences and 
ideologies will govern the doctrinal method chosen to interpret a case, which 
has a considerable effect on the case’s outcome. 
In response to the legal model’s shortcomings, scholars began 
questioning its validity as early at the 1930s, criticizing its disregard for 
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judicial discretion in many cases.92 Scholars created the attitudinal model, 
which maintains that judges make decisions to further their own political or 
ideological goals and maximize their utility.93 The Attitudinal Model purports 
that the values held by a judge play an important role in the decision. It was 
originally formulated by Glendon Schubert and applied by Jeffrey Segal and 
Harold Spaeth.94 
5.3 Research Design 
This study analyzes circuit court cases to determine the extent to 
which disagreement exists in the lower courts and the reasons for confusion. I 
will examine the methodology used by courts and the outcome reached. Cases 
that involved similar displays but resulted in different rulings or cases that 
employed different doctrines to come to the same ruling will support the claim 
that the Supreme Court has failed to produce guidelines that the lower courts 
can effectively apply to a wide range of cases. Then, a detailed case study will 
seek to explain the most problematic aspects of the Court’s rulings.  
The ninety four district courts, thirteen circuit courts, Supreme Court, 
and state court systems create the universe of religious display cases, a set too 
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large for this analysis. Compiling circuit court cases involving disputes of 
religious symbols displayed in the holiday context and analyzing the rulings 
provides a manageable case set that will accurately depict the way lower 
courts have responded to the Lynch and Allegheny decisions. This is the most 
reliable way to narrow down the data because of the nature of the judicial 
system. That is, the Supreme Court can decide only a small number of cases 
each year, leaving the circuit courts as the highest authority for the majority of 
litigation. Therefore, circuit courts become the court of last resort for most 
litigation due to the restrictions of the Supreme Court. As such, the ruling of 
the Circuit Court are the final say on almost all cases involving displays of 
religious symbols in the holiday context. Evaluation their decisions will 
provide an accurate representation of the problems that exist within the 
appellate court system.  
The case sets to be examined were created using Sheppard’s Citations, 
a service available through the LexisNexis database that uses the code given 
to federal decisions to generate a list of all cases that reference the decision. It 
also gives prior and subsequent history of the case and provides a “Signal 
Legend” that aids in choosing cases for review and then classifying and 
organizing cases. After doing a key word search for Appellate and Supreme 
Court cases that involved religious displays disputed under the Establishment 
Clause, I acquired a substantial list of cases. I removed cases that did not 
involve displays of religious symbols in the holiday context. I inputted the 
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codes into the Sheppard Citation service to expand my list of cases. I also read 
through each case looking for cases that the majority and dissent cited as 
support that involved displays of religious symbols in the holiday context.  
In this way, I generated a list of cases out of the entire universe of 
religious symbol Establishment Clause cases. I initially organized and 
examined the cases into three sets of Circuit Court rulings on religious 
displays: the first included Circuit Court rulings on religious display cases 
prior to the Lynch ruling in 1984; the second included religious display cases 
decided by Circuit Courts between the Lynch ruling in 1984 and the Allegheny 
ruling in 1989; the third included religious display rulings after the Allegheny 
ruling in 1989. I eliminated cases that were decided before Lynch because 
they are not relevant to a discussion of how Lynch and Allegheny affected 
lower court rulings. Although the courts were unsure as to how to decide these 
types of cases before Lynch, they were similarly confused after the Lynch 
ruling. Instead of providing clarification, the Court further confused 
Establishment Clause doctrine, resulting in even more problems for lower 
courts.95 
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Then, I considered the details of the display, the outcome of the case, 
unanimity or lack thereof by the panel of judges, and the opinion(s) issued. 
The details leading to the litigation and the outcome itself often determine the 
source of inconsistency and how often rulings contradict those of other 
circuits. Most circuit cases consist of a panel of three judges and most 
opinions that circuit courts issue are unanimous. The number of opinions and 
issuance of more than one opinion reveal the level of disagreement among that 
particular circuit’s judges. A high presence of split decisions will speak to the 
confusion across one geographical region, or possibly across several, 
stemming from the Supreme Court’s rulings. The opinion itself will uncover 
the parts of the Court’s precedent that are most problematic.  
The list of cases examined can be found in Appendix 1.  
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Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1980) (city's design and construction of platform, 
including large Latin cross, for papal visit found to have religious purpose); Citizens 
Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. Denver, 481 F. Supp. 522 (D.C. Colo. 
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5.4 Limitations of the Study 
 In no way is this study a comprehensive review of Establishment 
Clause case history, or even Establishment Clause doctrine with regards to 
religious symbols. I seek to analyze one sub-section of Establishment Clause 
cases, religious displays in the holiday context, in order to determine the 
effects of the unclear precedent of Lynch and Allegheny; the areas of the 
Supreme Court precedent are most troublesome for appellate courts, and the 
issues that the courts disagree with across circuits. By using a case study 
method, I will focus on analyzing opinions. This is not an empirical study of a 
large number of cases. That being said, the case set represents most, if not all, 
holiday display cases between 1984 and 2007, and the findings will be 
broadly applicable to other areas of Establishment Clause dispute. 
 
6. Results and Findings 
Lynch and Allegheny were intended to clarify Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and provide a standard for interpretation for lower courts to 
follow. However, the Court failed to agree upon a legal doctrine that would 
achieve these goals. This stems from a deeper conflict over the fundamental 
principles underlying the Establishment Clause, which prevents the Court 
from providing the guidance necessary to lower court decision-making. The 
data confirms that the Circuit Courts are divided regarding how to apply the 
detail-specific rulings of Lynch and Allegheny to the wide range of displays 
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that are brought to the Appellate Courts. Justice Brennan predicted this 
problem in his dissent in Lynch when he stated:  
[T]he Court reaches an essentially narrow result which turns largely 
upon the particular holiday context in which the city of Pawtucket's 
nativity scene appeared. The Court's decision implicitly leaves open 
questions concerning the constitutionality of the public display on 
public property of a crèche standing alone, or the public display of 
other distinctively religious symbols such as a cross.96 
 
Indeed, there is no consistency across circuits. Often, nearly identical displays 
are allowed by some courts and prohibited by others. 
6.1 The Big Picture 
 The data confirms that the circuits issue inconsistent rulings for similar 
displays. Table 6.1 presents the data that provides evidence of this pattern. It 
lists the cases chronologically and includes a variety of information on the 
background of the case and the ruling. The “Rulings” Column immediately 
shows this disjointedness; with decisions flip flopping back and forth from 
permissible to impermissible. 
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Table 6.1. Circuit Court Rulings, Compiled by Year. 
 
Case 
 
Year 
 
Circuit 
 
Description of the Display 
 
Ruling 
 
Doctrine 
 
McCreary v. Stone 
 
1984 
 
Second 
 
Crèche in public park decorated with lights, ornaments, 
and Christmas music 
 
Crèche 
allowed 
 
 
Lemon 
ACLU v. Birmingham 1986 Sixth Crèche on lawn of City Hall Crèche 
prohibited 
 
Lynch 
ACLU v. St Charles 1986 Seventh Cross on top of the fire department, 35 feet high and 75 
feet above street level (as part of a Christmas display 
including lit trees, snowflakes, reindeer, Santa Clause) 
Cross 
prohibited  
Schempp, 
historical 
analysis of the 
Cross  
 
AJC v. Chicago 1987 Seventh Crèche in city hall (argued as part of bigger scene-but 
court saw it as self contained) 
Crèche 
prohibited 
 
Lemon 
Kaplan v. City of 
Burlington 
1989 Second 16 ft Menorah in front of city hall (unattended, solitary) Menorah 
prohibited  
Allegheny 
(reasonable 
observer) 
 
Mather v. Mundelein 1989 Seventh Nativity scene on public park with Christmas tree, 
Santa, snowmen, etc 
Crèche 
allowed 
AJC v. 
Chicago, Lynch  
 
Smith v. Albemarle 1990 Forth Crèche on front lawn of County Office Building with 
sign reading "Sponsored by Charlottesville Jaycees" 
Crèche 
prohibited 
 
Allegheny 
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Case 
 
Year 
 
Circuit 
 
Description of the Display 
 
Ruling 
 
Doctrine 
 
ACLU v. Wilkinson 
 
1990 
 
Sixth 
 
Stable and manger without figurines located on capitol 
grounds (30ft decorated Christmas tree 100 located 
yards away, along with decorated street lamp posts, 
lighted trees, and ribbons) 
 
Stable 
allowed  
 
Allegheny 
(reasonable 
observer), 
Lemon 
 
Doe v. Clawson 1990 Sixth Crèche on front lawn of city hall with evergreen trees 
with lights, gifts, bows, Santa, and a "Noel" sign 
Crèche 
allowed 
Allegheny 
(Blackmun) 
 
Chabad-Lubavitch of 
Vermont v. Burlington 
1991 Second Menorah in park at city hall alongside a secular display 
as part of a combined holiday display 
Menorah 
allowed  
Allegheny, 
Kaplan 
 
Americans United v. 
Grand Rapids 
1992 Sixth 20 ft Menorah in a downtown public plaza Menorah 
allowed 
Reasonable 
observer  
 
Kreisner v. San Diego 1993 Ninth 8 religious scenes from the New Testament 
accompanied by biblical passages, in a public park 
Scene 
allowed 
Lemon, 
Allegheny 
 
Chabad-Lubavitch of 
Georgia v. Miller 
1993 Eleventh 15 foot tall Menorah in plaza in front of State Capital 
building with sign "Happy Chanukah from Chabad of 
Georgia" 
Menorah 
permitted  
No-preference, 
reasonable 
observer, 
Widmar 
 
Creatore v. Trumbull 1995 Second Crèche next to Christmas tree and menorah on town 
green 
 
 
Crèche 
allowed 
 
Allegheny 
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Case 
 
Year 
 
Circuit 
 
Description of the Display 
 
Ruling 
 
Doctrine 
 
AJC v. Beverly Hills 
 
1996 
 
Ninth 
 
27 ft Menorah in public park near city hall with a sign 
saying "This Menorah is Sponsored by Chabad of 
California. It is Not Funded or Sponsored by the City 
of Beverly Hills" 
 
 
Menorah 
prohibited 
 
Unclear-
references 
numerous 
precedents 
Elewski v. Syracuse 1997 Second Crèche with a banner that says "Glory to God in the 
Highest" at base of a 50 foot illuminated tree in a 
downtown public square decorated with ornaments. 
Across from this square is a Menorah display. 
 
Crèche 
allowed 
Allegheny 
(reasonable 
observer) 
ACLU v. Schundler 1999 Third Crèche and menorah on city land in front of city hall 
modified to include secular symbols 
Modified 
display 
allowed 
Allegheny 
(reasonable 
observer) 
 
ACLU v. Florissant 1999 Eighth Crèche at City Civic Center (part of display with 
"Seasons Greetings" sign, reindeer, candy canes, 
presents, snowman 
 
Crèche 
allowed 
Allegheny 
Wells v. City and 
County of Denver 
2001 Tenth Poem (against religion) petitioned to be included in a 
display of a Crèche, tin soldiers, Christmas tree, Santa, 
snowmen on steps of City and County building  
 
Not require 
to display 
poem 
Citizens 
Concerned, 
Lemon 
Skoros v. NY 2006 Second Crèche (in school where menorah and star and crescent 
were allowed) 
Not required 
to display 
crèche  
Lemon 
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To interpret these apparent inconsistencies and evaluate their cause, 
the 20 cases evaluated in this study can be classified according to the type of 
display. Two categories of cases emerge from the data presented in Table 6.1. 
The first group includes displays of a single, unattended religious symbol, 
such as a solitary crèche or menorah. The second group encompasses displays 
with one or more symbols, such as a menorah and Christmas tree, included as 
part of a larger display with clearly secular symbols, such as a reindeer, candy 
cane, or banner. These groups are distinctly different and provide crucial 
insight into analyzing the effects of Lynch and Allegheny.  
6.2 Unattended Displays 
Twelve cases fall under the category of unattended displays, as listed 
below by circuit. Table 6.2 displays these cases in chronological order and 
reveals that a vast portion of the reported inconsistency comes from this 
group. 
McCreary v. Stone (2nd Cir. 1984) 739 F.2d 716  
Elewski v. City of Syracuse (2nd Cir. 1997) 123 F.3d 51  
Smith v. County of Albemarle (4th Circuit 1989) 895 F.2d 953 
ACLU v. Birmingham (6th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 1561 
Americans United v. City of Grand Rapids (6th Circuit 1992) 980 F.2d 1538 
American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 120  
American Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills (9th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 379  
Kaplan v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 1024  
Skoros v. New York (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1 
Kreisner v. City of San Diego (9th Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 775 
Chabad-Lubavitch of GA v. Miller (11th Cir. 1993) 5 F.3d 1383 
ACLU v. Wilkinson (6th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1098  
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Table 6.2. Circuit Court Rulings on Unattended Displays Religious Symbols. 
 
 
Case 
 
Year 
 
Circuit 
 
Vote 
 
Description of the Display 
 
Ruling 
 
Doctrine 
 
McCreary V. Stone 
 
1984 
 
Second 
 
3:0 
 
Crèche in public park decorated with lights, ornaments, 
and Christmas music (seen at single self contained) 
 
Crèche 
allowed 
 
 
Lemon 
ACLU v. Birmingham 1986 Sixth 2:1 Crèche on lawn of City Hall Crèche 
prohibited 
 
Lynch 
AJC v. Chicago 1987 Seventh 2:1 Crèche in city hall (argued as part of bigger scene-but 
court saw it as self contained) 
Crèche 
prohibited 
 
Lemon 
Kaplan v. City of 
Burlington 
1989 Second 2:1 16 ft Menorah in front of city hall  Menorah 
prohibited  
Allegheny 
(reasonable 
observer) 
 
Smith v. Albemarle 1990 Forth 2:1 Crèche on front lawn of County Office Building with 
sign reading "Sponsored by Charlottesville Jaycees" 
Crèche 
prohibited 
 
Allegheny 
ACLU v. Wilkinson 1990 Sixth 2:1 Stable and manger without figurines located on capitol 
grounds (30ft decorated Christmas tree 100 located 
yards away near decorated street lamps, lighted trees) 
Stable 
allowed  
Allegheny 
(reasonable 
observer), 
Lemon 
 
Americans United v. 
Grand Rapids 
1992 Sixth 14:1 20 ft Menorah in a downtown public plaza Menorah 
allowed 
Reasonable 
Observer  
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Case 
 
Year 
 
Circuit 
 
Vote 
 
Description of the Display 
 
Ruling 
 
Doctrine 
 
Kreisner v. San Diego 
 
1993 
 
Ninth 
 
2:1 
 
8 religious scenes from the New Testament 
accompanied by biblical passages, in a public park 
 
Scene 
allowed 
 
Lemon, 
Allegheny 
 
 
Chabad-Lubavitch of 
Georgia v. Miller 
1993 Eleventh 11:0 15 foot tall Menorah in plaza in front of State Capital 
building with sign "Happy Chanukah from Chabad of 
Georgia" 
Menorah 
allowed 
No-
preference, 
reasonable 
observer, 
Widmar 
 
AJC v. Beverly Hills 1996 Ninth 11:0 27 ft Menorah in public park near city hall with a sign 
saying "This Menorah is Sponsored by Chabad of 
California. It is Not Funded or Sponsored by the City 
of Beverly Hills" 
 
Menorah 
prohibited 
Unclear-
references 
numerous 
precedents 
Elewski v. Syracuse 1997 Second 2:1 Crèche with a banner that says "Glory to God in the 
Highest" at base of a 50 foot illuminated tree in a 
downtown public square decorated with ornaments. 
Across from this square is a Menorah display. 
 
Crèche 
allowed 
Allegheny 
(reasonable 
observer) 
Skoros v. NY 2006 Second 2:1 Crèche (in school where menorah and star and crescent 
were allowed) 
Not required 
to display 
crèche  
 
Lemon 
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Table 6.2 illuminates the erratic rulings in this category of cases. 
Examining several of these cases sheds light on the problems judges faced and 
the areas where they disagreed. In McCreary v. Stone in 1984, the Second 
Circuit upheld a crèche that was privately owned and located in a public 
park.97 The Village refused to allow a private group to construct a nativity 
scene in the public park as it had done in past years.98 The Second Circuit held 
that permitting the display would not violate the Establishment Clause, 
referencing Lynch and refuting the Village’s claims that the displays in Lynch 
and McCreary could be distinguished based on the physical context (the 
inclusion of other objects).99 Rather, it focused on the “context of the 
Christmas season.”100 In this way, the Second Circuit interpreted Lynch in the 
broad sense, a pattern which continued with other cases.  
Whereas the Second Circuit upheld the crèche in McCreary, in 1987 
the Seventh Circuit ruled in American Jewish Congress v. Chicago that a 
crèche located inside City Hall was unconstitutional.101 The display included a 
nativity scene and a banner that stated “On Earth peace-Good Will toward 
Men.”102 About 10-90 feet away the city displayed other objects, such as a 
Christmas tree, Santa, reindeer, and disclaimer signs saying that the display 
                                                 
97
 McCreary v. Stone 739 F.2d 716 (2nd Cir. 1984). 
98
 Id. at 719. 
99
 Id. at 728-29. 
100
 Id. at 728. 
101
 American Jewish Congress v. Chicago 827 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 1987). 
102
 Id. at 122. 
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was not endorsed by the government.103 The Seventh Circuit, viewing only the 
crèche and not the other symbols, struck down the crèche.  
Unlike the Second Circuit, which adopted a broad view of Lynch, the 
Seventh Circuit Judges in City of Chicago distinguished the display from 
Lynch due to its location, inside the City Hall, and its solitary placement.104 
Rather than part of the display located some feet away, the Court viewed the 
crèche as solitary.105 After satisfying that the display was clearly different than 
Lynch and therefore not subject to its precedent, the Court used Lemon to 
judge the scene as a violation due to its message of government endorsement 
of religion.106 
Judge Easterbrook, dissenting in American Jewish Congress v. 
Chicago, discusses the problems that Lynch created by forcing judges to look 
at the contextual placement of the symbol. The issue with viewing the context 
is that it turns a constitutional rule, which “identifies cases of concern and 
prescribes outcomes for them” into a standard, which “identifies an 
objective…and transfers to some other body the decisions about how much of 
that value to achieve.”107 Therefore, the outcome of a case becomes dependent 
on a judge’s view of the facts at hand. He criticizes Justice O’Connor’s 
 
                                                 
103
 Id at 122-23. 
104
 Id. at 126. 
105
 Id. at 126. 
106
 Id. at 126-28. 
107
 AJC v. Congress, 827 F.2d 120 (1987), Easterbrook dissenting. 
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“reasonable observer” test as a standard that changes the meaning of the text 
by allowing judges to rule using their own prejudices. The real question is not 
if “the members of this panel see this crèche as part of an integrated secular 
display, but whether the reasonable people could see it so.”108 
As an advocate for strict separation whose views fall in line with those 
of Levy and Kurland, Easterbrook believes that government should have no 
involvement with religion. Instead, judges should defer these issues to the 
legislative branch. Although his position is on the far end of the spectrum, the 
issue he presents is valid and encapsulates the fundamental problems with 
judicial line-drawing. Easterbrook criticizes the Lynch majority for 
“…requiring scrutiny more commonly associated with interior decorators than 
with the judiciary.”109 
These two cases illustrate the broader pattern and lack of consistency 
representative of cases involving a solitary symbol. In six cases, a crèche or 
menorah on public land was upheld as constitutional (McCreary, Elewski, 
Grand Rapids, Kreisner, Wilkinson, Miller). In six cases, the crèche or 
menorah was viewed as violating the Establishment Clause (Kaplan, Smith, 
Birmingham, City of Chicago, Beverly Hills, and Skoros). 
 
 
                                                 
108
 827 F.2d 120 (1987), Easterbrook dissenting. 
109
 827 F.2d 120 (1987), Easterbrook dissenting. 
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6.3 Combined Displays 
The remaining eight cases are classified as combined displays, which 
are presented in Table 6.3.  
Doe v. Clawson (6th Circuit 1990) 915 F.2d 244  
ACLU v. City of St. Charles (7th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 265  
Mather v. Village of Mundelein (7th Cir. 1989) 864 F.2d 1291 
ACLU v. City of Florrisant (8th circuit 1999) 186 F.3d  
Wells v. City and County of Denver (10th Circuit 2001) 257 F.3d 1132 
Chabad-Lubavitch v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 109  
Creatore v. Town of Trumbull (2nd Cir. 1995) 68 F.3d 59  
 ACLU v. Schundler (3d Cir. 1999) 168 F.3d 92/104 F.3d 1435 
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Table 6.3: Circuit Court Rulings on Combined Displays of Religious Symbols. 
 
 
Case 
 
Year 
 
Circuit 
 
Vote 
 
Description of the Display 
 
Ruling 
 
Doctrine 
 
ACLU v. St Charles 
 
1986 
 
Seventh 
 
3:0 
 
Cross on top of the fire department, 35 feet high and 75 
feet above street level (as part of a Christmas display 
including lit trees, snowflakes, reindeer, Santa Clause) 
 
Cross 
prohibited  
 
Schempp, 
historical 
analysis of the 
Cross  
 
Mather v. Mundelein 1989 Seventh 2:1 Nativity scene in public park with Christmas tree, Santa, 
snowmen 
Crèche allowed AJC v. 
Chicago, Lynch  
 
Doe v. Clawson 1990 Sixth 3:0 Crèche on front lawn of city hall with evergreen trees with 
lights, gifts, bows, Santa, and a "Noel" sign 
Crèche allowed Allegheny 
(Blackmun) 
 
Chabad-Lubavitch of 
Vermont v. Burlington 
1991 Second 3:0 Menorah in park at city hall alongside a secular display as 
part of a combined holiday display 
Menorah 
allowed  
Allegheny, 
Kaplan 
 
Creatore v. Trumbull 1995 Second 3:0 Crèche next to Christmas tree and menorah on town green Crèche allowed 
 
Allegheny 
ACLU v. Schundler 1999 Third 2:1 Crèche and menorah on city land in front of city hall 
modified to include secular symbols 
Display allowed 
 
Allegheny  
 
ACLU v. Florissant 1999 Eighth 3:0 Crèche at City Civic Center part of a display with 
"Seasons Greetings" sign, reindeer, candy canes, presents 
 
Crèche allowed Allegheny 
Wells v. City and 
County of Denver 
2001 Tenth 2:1 Poem (against religion) petitioned to be included in a 
display of a Crèche, tin soldiers, Christmas tree, Santa, 
snowmen on steps of City and County building  
Not required to 
display poem 
Citizens 
Concerned, 
Lemon 
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These cases seem to support that a religious symbol combined with 
secular objects will, by and large, pass constitutional evaluation. As seen by 
Burlington, Creatore, and Schundler, these displays can include both crèches 
and menorahs and still pass constitutional muster. The idea is that the 
inclusion of secular objects mitigates the religious tones of the message 
perceived by the reasonable observer. The result is a message of religious 
pluralism, tolerance, and celebration of the history of the season, rather than a 
government endorsement of religion. Judge Nelson aptly describes and 
critiques this so called “St. Nicholas too” test or “plastic reindeer too” rule, in 
his dissent in ACLU v. City of Birmingham, holding: 
[A] city can get by with displaying a crèche if it throws in a sleigh full 
of toys and a Santa Claus, too. The application of such a test may 
prove troublesome in practice. Will a mere Santa Claus suffice, or 
must there be a Mrs. Claus? Are reindeer needed? If so, will one do or 
must there be a full compliment of eight? Or is it now nine.110 
 
The ridiculousness of his questions embodies the sentiment of those against 
such a rule, who question where to draw the line between secular and 
religious. Critics also doubt that the presence of a Santa negates the religious 
message inherent in a display like the crèche. As Daniel Parish maintains in 
his article Private Religious Displays, “…more becomes better, or at least 
safer…groups seeking to pass on a religious message are encouraged to cloak 
it in quasi-secular trappings.”111  
                                                 
110
 ACLU v. Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569. 
111
 Parish, 282. 
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Supporters of this rule, such as George Janocsko, hold that it provides 
a clear analytical framework, whereas the Allegheny precedent requires that 
judges use an ad-hoc, case by case, line drawing method to decision 
making.112 Justice Kennedy denounces the endorsement approach supported 
by the majority in Allegheny, criticizing it as: 
[J]urisprudence of minutiae. A reviewing court must consider whether 
the city has included Santa’s, talking wishing wells, reindeer, or other 
secular symbols as ‘a center of attention separate from the crèche’.113  
 
This depicts the views of the many critics of this rule, who view it as a way to 
pass constitutional scrutiny for a display that does actually endorse religion. 
Justice Kennedy, though especially judgmental of this approach, accurately 
describes shortfalls of this method when he mocks the Allegheny majority and 
says, “This test could provide workable guidance to the lower courts, if ever, 
only after this Court has decided a long series of holiday display cases, using 
little more than intuition and a tape measure.”114 
Despite the clear constitutional disagreement over this method, the 
case data shows that it yields consistent results for combined religious-secular 
displays. This could reasonably result from the fact that the importance of the 
context of the display was emphasized in both Lynch and Allegheny. Both 
cases stress that the physical setting and surroundings of the display are 
fundamental to determining whether a reasonable passerby would view the 
                                                 
112
 Janocsko, 487.  
113
 492 U.S. 573 at 674. 
114
 Id. at 673. 
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scene as a governmental support of religion. Therefore, when a panel of 
judges is presented with a case involving a scene that unambiguously includes 
secular objects like snowmen, Santa Claus, and reindeer, they employ the 
reasonable observer test, or the “Plastic Reindeer Too” Test, without 
difficulty. Although the merits of this method may be disputed, it nonetheless 
provides a clearer rule for judicial scrutiny. This diminishes the effect that 
judicial preferences have on the outcome. 
On the other hand, when a panel is required to determine the validity 
of a claim against a free-standing Menorah, the judges are not equipped with 
as clear a rule. They must embark on a distinction process to determine 
whether the case at hand can be determined under the Lynch or Allegheny 
precedent, or if a wholly different standard must be used. The various methods 
result in different outcomes and allow judicial preferences to play a more 
significant role in the decision making process. Whether the panel has judges 
that favor a separation, accommodation, or neutral approach will play a bigger 
part in the decision. Suddenly, the Christmas lights 100 yards away may be 
included as part of the scene, but the Menorah across the street may be 
excluded. The question of what a “reasonable observer” would perceive from 
the scene is much harder to answer. By nature, it allows for judicial opinion to 
enter into the decision. With panels randomly selected from a large pool of 
diverse judges, it makes sense that the two groups vary so widely in terms of 
consistency. 
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The issue then, is whether this variance can be resolved. An obvious 
solution is to abandon the ad hoc approach currently utilized and create a 
single, unifying theory for religious freedom cases. This does not seem 
feasible considering the current division on the Court, and it may not be 
desirable either. Even if the different ideologies of the justices could be 
reconciled and a single test agreed upon, there will still remain significant 
disagreement because of the Constitutional text itself. Beyond establishing a 
national church, the Establishment Clause is devoid of absolutes. The issues 
that the justices will have to resolve are not explicitly stated by an 
undisputable source.  
Further, a justice’s approach is inextricably tied to their preferences 
and background. This division is portrayed by Justice White in his opinion in 
Public Education v. Regan when he acknowledges, “But Establishment 
Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among 
ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the people 
of this country.”115  For example, the extent to which a law affects religious 
practice enough to be unconstitutional depends on where that judge draws the 
line between belief and practice and how much of a hindrance it takes to cross 
the line into the impermissible. Similarly, what counts as coercion will vary 
based on how a judge perceives the effects of the law as well as the amount of 
                                                 
115
 Everson v. Education 444 U.S. 646 (1980), 662.  
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coercion necessary to invalidate a law. This applies to the definition of 
religion and what could be considered to endorse a certain religion. 
However, a single test may sacrifice liberty for consistency, which is 
not desirable either. The Court recognizes that “There are always risks is 
treating criteria discussed by the Court from time to time as ‘tests’ in any 
limiting sense of the term. Constitutional adjudication does not lend itself to 
the absolutes of the physical sciences or mathematics.”116 Justice O’Connor 
agrees with this and argues for an approach that does “more than erect a 
constitutional ‘signpost,’ to be followed or ignored in a particular case as our 
predilections may dictate. Instead, our goal should be ‘to frame a principle for 
constitutional adjudication that is not only grounded in the history and 
language of the first amendment, but one that is also capable of consistent 
application to the relevant problems.’”117 A test that is capable of changing as 
times change, as O’Connor points out, shows a positive progression toward a 
theory that fully embodies the First Amendment guarantees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116
 Tilton v. Richardson 403 U.S. 672 (1970), 679. 
117
 Wallace v. Jaffre 72 US 38 (1985), 69. 
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7. Conclusions 
The key issue that creates diverging rulings in these cases centers on 
lack of a consistent means of interpretation. Neither the Lemon test nor the 
endorsement test nor neutrality, non-coercion, nor strict separation provides 
consistent results. Further, the precedent, especially the Allegheny opinions, 
actually serve to create more variance across courts as different circuits adopt 
different rules. Though this study cannot speak to other symbolic 
Establishment Clause cases, it is reasonable that the troubles presented by 
cases involving religious displays in the holiday context carry over to other 
religious symbol cases. These include postings of the Ten Commandments, 
public display of the cross, religious statutes, religious symbols on money, 
city seals, and similar markings, and a range of others.  
This underlines the shortcomings of the Establishment Clause and its 
applicability to current day issues. The inability to develop methods for 
interpreting holiday display cases, not to mention other types of religious 
displays, has serious consequences. Without a clear test or doctrine to apply, 
the lower courts decide cases based on their best interpretation of the 
majority’s ruling. In the case of Allegheny, with at least four different opinions 
offering four tests, lower courts have discretion regarding which test to apply. 
The result has been incoherency across the circuits. This creates a different 
standard of law across the nation. In some areas, a freestanding crèche is 
permitted. In other areas, this fails to hold true, making it difficult for city 
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leaders trying to plan the holiday display without incurring law suit fees that 
can cripple its operations. 
Lower courts have had the most disparity in cases that involve a 
solitary display of a religious symbol. They tend to divide on what counts as 
part of the display that will affect the viewer’s perceived message. On the 
other hand, when presented with cases that combine secular and religious 
symbols, they tend to uphold the display using the reasonable observer test. 
This presents the question of whether this test adequately protects 
Establishment Clause guarantees, calling into question whether a single 
approach is possible. Justices in several cases have spoken to whether this is 
feasible. The Court has refused to formally adopt any concrete test, which 
“sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility [and] promises to be the 
case until the continuing interaction between the States…produces a single, 
more encompassing construction of the Establishment Clause.”118 The need 
for the Supreme Court to elucidate a standard that is more substantive is 
becoming increasingly important as the lower courts fracture in their 
interpretations. While a single approach may not be likely, this analysis points 
to the importance of making the First Amendment guarantees applicable to a 
modern society in a way that upholds religious freedom while ensuring 
uniformity in judicial outcomes across the United States. 
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  Regan 444 U.S. 646 (1980) 662. 
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Appendix 1: Case Set for Analysis 
 
 
2nd Circuit: 
McCreary v. Stone (2nd Cir. 1984) 739 F.2d 716 June 21, 1984 
 Board of Trustees v. McCreary 471 U.S. 83 March 27, 1985 
Kaplan v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1989) 891 F.2d 1024 December 12, 1989 
Chabad-Lubavitch v. City of Burlington (2nd Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 109 July 21, 1991 
Creatore v. Town of Trumbull (2nd Cir. 1995) 68 F.3d 59 October 17, 1995 
Elewski v. City of Syracuse (2nd Cir. 1997) 123 F.3d 51 August 14, 1997 
Skoros v. New York (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3d 1 February 2, 2006 
 
3rd Circuit: 
ACLU v. Schundler (3d Cir. 1999) 168 F.3d 92/104 F.3d 1435 February 16, 1999 
 
4th Circuit: 
Smith v. County of Albemarle (4th Circuit 1989) 895 F.2d 953 February 8, 1990 
 
6th Circuit: 
ACLU v. Birmingham (6th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 1561 June 11, 1986 
ACLU v. Wilkinson (6th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1098 February 8, 1990 
Doe v. Clawson (6th Circuit 1990) 915 F.2d 244 October 1, 1990 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids (6th 
Circuit 1992) 980 F.2d 1538 November 16, 1992 
 
7th Circuit: 
ACLU v. City of St. Charles (7th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 265 June 6, 1986 
American Jewish Congress v. Chicago (7th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 120 August 18, 1987 
Mather v. Village of Mundelein (7th Cir. 1989) 864 F.2d 1291 January 4, 1989 
 
8th Circuit: 
ACLU v. City of Florrisant (8th circuit 1999) 186 F.3d August 16, 1999 
 
9th Circuit: 
Kreisner v. City of San Diego (9th Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 775 August 2, 1993 
American Jewish Cong. v. City of Beverly Hills (9th Cir. 1996) 90 F.3d 379 July 19, 
1996 
 
10th Circuit: 
Wells v. City and County of Denver (10th Circuit 2001) 257 F.3d 1132 July 2, 2001 
 
11th Circuit: 
Chabad Lubavitch of GA v. Miller (11th Cir. 1993) 976 F.2d 1386 October 18, 1993 
 
Supreme Court: 
Lynch v. Donnelly (S.C 1984) 465 U.S. 668 March 5, 1984 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU (S.C. 1989) 492 U.S. 573 July 3, 1989 
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Written Capstone Summary 
 
 
This project explored one sub-sect of the First Amendment: religious 
symbols displayed during the holiday season. Religious symbols are protected 
as part of the religious freedom granted by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”119 These 
phrases guarantee freedom from and of religion; that is, freedom from state or 
Federal creation of a national church or declaration of a national religion and 
freedom to practice religion without interference from state or federal 
governments. Taken together, the establishment clause and free exercise 
clause point in opposite directions. The establishment clause calls for a 
separation of government and religion, requiring that government does not 
sponsor one religion over another, or over irreligion. Whereas the free 
exercise clause protects individuals from government interference with private 
religious expression.120 For example, laws that grant exceptions for certain 
religious practices are often challenged as government endorsements of 
religion. However, denying such exemptions can result in prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion. The result is a clash of the two clauses.  
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The broad language of the establishment clause, combined with the 
importance of religion in American culture and government provide an 
inherent source of tension and confusion in constitutional interpretation. The 
language of the clause is vague: Congress may not establish a religion, but 
what defines a religion, what constitutes an establishment thereof, and what is 
a law “respecting” such establishment? The role of religion historically 
compounds this issue. Though America was founded on the principle of 
religious freedom, government and religion have been intertwined throughout 
American history. This is especially evident in the founding period: The 
Declaration of Independence references a “Creator,” George Washington 
declared that November 26th should be a day to give thanks and pray to the 
Lord, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison supported such a “thanksgiving” 
day and issued religious proclamations, Congress sessions begin with a 
prayer, Court sessions open by saying “God save the United States and this 
honorable Court,” the pledge of allegiance states that the U.S. is “one nation, 
under God,” the national slogan is “In God We Trust.”121 This is not an 
exhaustive list of governmental endorsements of religion from the founding 
period. Plus, most of these practices still occur today.  
These practices are a direct result of the fact that America was settled 
by Protestants escaping religious persecution. As such, religious freedom was 
a defining principle underlying the new government. However, in banning 
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Congress from passing laws that sponsor or prohibit religious activities, the 
settlers did not intend to banish every reference to God or religion by any 
governmental institution. As a homogenously Protestant society, the religious 
activities detailed above were not considered congressional legislation.  
The inevitable confusion and disagreement over the precise meaning 
of the Establishment Clause combined with the importance of religious liberty 
calls for a clear, consistent method to determine Establishment Clause cases. 
Regardless, the Court has failed to develop a reliable approach to analyze the 
constitutionality and bounds of government involvement in religion. For over 
sixty years the Court has regularly heard cases that claim violations of the 
guarantees of the Establishment Clause, yet it has failed to produce a 
framework for analysis that is generally applicable, gives coherent decisions, 
and is agreed upon by the majority of the Court. Instead, Establishment Clause 
doctrine is inconsistent with frequent changes in viewpoints, methodology, 
tests, and defining principles underlying the clause.122 
 Government sponsorship of religious symbols is one area of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence that has fueled substantial controversy 
and constitutional debate. Private displays of religious symbols on public 
property or publicly funded religious displays call into question whether the 
government is endorsing a particular religion. This arises from the character of 
religious symbols themselves, a central aspect of religious practice and a 
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primary mechanism of conveying the beliefs of the religion. The issue is most 
commonly seen in the inclusion of religious relics in displays that celebrate 
official observances of holidays that have a religious origin.123 Nativity 
scenes, or crèches, that celebrate Christmas, a federal holiday with religious 
origins, are disputed most frequently. Christmas, and several other holidays of 
religious origin, present problems because they have both secular and 
religious elements. In a display with secular elements, such as a Santa Claus, 
and religious elements, such as a nativity scene depicting the birth of Jesus, it 
is often hard to establish the overall message emanating from the display. 
Even displays of a Menorah without any secular objects can be viewed as a 
secular celebration of the holiday depending on its placement. Thus, the issue 
becomes complicated for cities, town, and private entities that wish to erect 
displays on public property or using public funds.  
Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984 and County of Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989, 
the only religious display cases decided by the Court on the grounds on 
Establishment Clause violations, demonstrate the inadequacies of the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Bare majorities issued opposite rulings 
for similar displays, opinions were numerous and obscure, and the members 
of the Court vigorously disagreed with one another.  
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Discord among the Court has serious implications for the judicial 
system and for local governments. Discrepancy in methods, results, and 
opinions threatens the credibility of the Court. This not only confuses the idea 
of religious freedom, but it also threatens its very core. Additionally, it creates 
inconsistency among circuit, district, and local courts across the nation. The 
Supreme Court can hear a limited number of cases each year, so appellate 
courts play a key role in ensuring implementation of the Court’s decisions and 
consistency of federal law. With a narrow majority, varying results between 
the two main cases, and multiple opinions all proposing substantially different 
theories and tests, lower courts’ decision making process is compromised. 
Considering that circuit and district courts are divided geographically and that 
the Supreme Court can hear a miniscule fraction of the number of cases it 
receives for appeal, there will be different standards across the nation for 
religious displays based on the rulings of the courts in those regions.  
Scholars and judges are highly critical of the Court’s rulings and agree 
that they have resulted in conflicting rulings among the district and circuit 
courts. However, there is scarce literature examining a large number of the 
cases that have emerged in lower courts due to Lynch and Allegheny. This 
leaves many important questions unanswered. Do Lynch and Allegheny 
actually produce the degree of lower court chaos that many scholars depict? 
Does variance come from a small number of courts issuing conflicting 
decisions or are all courts similarly confused? When courts issue rulings that 
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conflict with the precedent of the Supreme Court or of other lower courts, 
what causes the clash? That is, what parts of the Lynch and Allegheny 
decisions are most perplexing? In this thesis, I intend to embark on a review 
of the Lynch and Allegheny progeny in order to provide substantive answers to 
these questions.  
The ninety four district courts, thirteen circuit courts, Supreme Court, 
and state court systems create the universe of religious display cases. 
Compiling circuit court rulings and analyzing the rulings provides a 
manageable case set that will accurately depict the way lower courts have 
responded to the Lynch and Allegheny decisions. This is because the Supreme 
Court can decide a small number of cases each year, leaving the circuit court 
as the highest authority for the majority of litigation. Circuit Courts become 
the court of last resort for most disputes. Therefore, the rulings of the Circuit 
Court provide the final say on cases involving displays of religious symbols in 
the holiday context. A Sheppard’s Citation Search and LexisNexis Search 
produced a set of 20 cases.  
The 20 cases evaluated in this study were classified according to the 
type of display. Two categories of cases emerged: displays of a single, 
unattended religious symbol, such as a solitary crèche or menorah and 
displays with one or more symbols, such as a menorah and Christmas tree, 
included as part of a larger display with clearly secular symbols, such as a 
reindeer, candy cane, or banner.  
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There is clear inconsistency among Circuit Courts regarding cases of a 
solitary symbol. In six cases, a crèche or menorah on public land was upheld 
as constitutional (McCreary, Elewski, Grand Rapids, Kreisner, Wilkinson, 
Miller). In six cases, the crèche or menorah was viewed as violating the 
Establishment Clause (Kaplan, Smith, Birmingham, City of Chicago, Beverly 
Hills, and Skoros). The results from combined cases support that a religious 
symbol combined with secular objects will, by and large, pass constitutional 
evaluation. For combined displays, the inclusion of secular objects mitigates 
the religious tones of the message perceived by the reasonable observer. The 
result is a message of religious pluralism, tolerance, and celebration of the 
history of the season, rather than a government endorsement of religion. This 
results from the importance of the context of the display that was emphasized 
in Lynch and Allegheny. Therefore, when a panel of judges is presented with a 
case involving a scene that unambiguously includes secular objects like 
snowmen, Santa Claus, and reindeer, they employ the reasonable observer 
test, or the “Plastic Reindeer Too” Test, without difficulty.  
For unattended displays, the judges are not equipped with a clear rule. 
They must embark on a distinction process to determine whether the case can 
be decided under the Lynch or Allegheny precedent, or if a wholly different 
standard must be used. Not only do these result in different outcomes, but they 
also force the judges to investigate the display with more scrutiny. By nature, 
it allows for judicial opinion to enter into the decision. Whether the panel has 
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judges that favor a separation, accommodation, or neutral approach will play a 
bigger part in the decision. And with panels randomly selected from a large 
pool of diverse judges, it makes sense that the two groups are vary so widely 
in terms of consistency. The overarching issue still remains that the Court 
needs to provide better guidance for lower courts.  
This project is significant because it is the first of its kind to compile 
all of the case data together and organize it to shower meaningful patterns. 
Though other scholars have discussed and compared some of these cases, I 
have yet to come across a paper that systematically analyzes all of the 
holiday-context religious display cases. Further, this study sheds light on the 
reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s seemingly erratic decisions and seeks 
to explain them in a way that validates the Court’s decisions. Hopefully, this 
renews faith in the judicial process, which some people believe is broken, by 
showing that discrepancies are a part of constitutional evolution and are 
necessary as our county modernizes. There is a natural “lag time” between 
societal changes and constitutional catch up. This project can be expanded in 
the future to a wider Establishment Clause analysis which has the potential to 
provide even more insight to understanding and protecting religious freedom. 
